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Constitutional Law-Payton v. New York: Home Arrest in the
Shelter of Search and Seizure Law
For decades judicial responses to the propriety of routine, warrantless
home arrests have been conflicting,' purposefully restrained,2 or relegated to
dictum.3 In Payton v. New York 4 the Supreme Court at last has determined
the constitutional status of such arrests, holding that, absent exigent circum-
stances, warrantless and nonconsensual home entry and arrest, albeit effected
with statutory authority and probable cause, is per se unreasonable under the
fourth amendment.
5
Payton v. New York combines two appeals from the New York Court of
Appeals 6 in which police officers made warrantless entries to arrest as author-
ized by the New York Code of Criminal Procedure.7 In the first case8 officers
pursuing Theodore Payton, an armed robbery and murder suspect, went to his
apartment without a warrant. They observed light and heard the sounds of a
radio emanating from within and knocked.9 When no one responded, the of-
ficers summoned emergency help and eventually forced open the door. The
officers entered, found the premises vacant, and seized a shell casing that was
in plain view. 10 Because state law sanctioned such warrantless entries11 and
1. Federal and state courts have reached diverse holdings on the constitutionality of war-
rantless home arrests. Compare, e.g., United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978); Dorman
v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc); and People v. Ramey, 16 Cal.3d 263,
545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976) with State v. Perez, 277 So. 2d 778 (Fla.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1064 (1973) and People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 380 N.E.2d 224, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1978).
See text accompanying notes 50-59, 72-90 infra.
2. "[W]e do not today consider or decide whether or under what circumstances an officer
lawfully may make a warrantless arrest in a private home or other place where the person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy." United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 432-33 (1976) (Powell,
J., concurring). Also see id. at 433 (Stewart, J., concurring) and note 72 infra.
"But we find it unnecessary to decide the question [of the constitutionality of forceful, night-
time, warrantless entry into a dwelling to arrest] in this case." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 481 (1971). "[W]e do not consider this issue [of forceful nighttime entry into a dwelling
to arrest a person reasonably believed to be within upon probable cause that he had committed a
felony under circumstances where no reason appears why an arrest warrant could not have been
sought] fairly presented by this case." Jones v. -United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1958).
3. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 480-81 (1971); note 74 infra.
4. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
5. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6. People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 380 N.E.2d 224, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1978).
7. See note 11 infra.
8. People v. Payton, 84 Misc. 2d 973, 376 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
9. Id. at 974, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 780. Probable cause was provided by eyewitnesses who iden-
tified defendant and gave the police his home address two days after the crime. Id.
10. Id. The police also conducted a full search of the apartment, seizing other evidence that
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exigent circumstances excused the officers from their statutory duty to an-
nounce authority and purpose,' 2 the trial judge declared the entry valid and
the shell casing admissible.
13
In the second case 14 police investigating a robbery made a noontime war-
rantless home arrest15 of Obie Riddick as authorized by New York statute.
16
The defendant's three-year-old son 17 answered the officers' knock on the door,
and they entered, announced their authority18 and placed Riddick under ar-
rest. Riddick was in bed at the time of his arrest and was not allowed to dress
until the officers searched the bed, closet, and bureau. Looking for weapons,
the officers found drugs and a syringe instead. When Riddick was indicted
later on narcotics charges, the trial court ruled the narcotics admissible as hav-
ing been obtained incident to a lawful arrest.19
was later suppressed by concession of the district attorney. 45 N.Y.2d 300, 305-06, 380 N.E.2d
224, 226, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395, 397.
11. Sections of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure in effect at the time authorized an
officer to arrest without warrant "[w]hen a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reason-
able cause for believing the person to be arrested to have committed it," and to break a door or
window "if, after notice of his office and purpose, he be refused admittance." 45 N.Y.2d at 306
n.l, 380 N.E.2d at 226 n.1, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 397 n.l.
12. The trial judge held that the gravity of the offense plus the probability that the suspect
was armed, dangerous and likely to escape combined to create exigent circumstances. 84 Misc.2d
at 975, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 781. Thus the New York statute was complied with. See note 11 Supra.
Justice Stevens noted, however, that the trial judge had no reason to determine whether those
circumstances were so exigent as tojustify the failure to obtain a warrant. 445 U.S. at 577-78. Nor
did the Payton Court decide this question; it was remanded to the New York Court of Appeals.
Id. at 583, 603.
13. 84 Misc. 2d at 975-76, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 781.
14. Riddick v. New York, 56 A.D.2d 937, 392 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1977).
15. 45 N.Y.2d at 307, 380 N.E.2d at 227, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 398. Probable cause was provided
by the victim's identification of defendant two years after the crime and acquisition of defendant's
address six months thereafter. Id. Although the arrest was delayed an additional two months,
neither the New York Court of Appeals nor the United States Supreme Court questioned the
officers' failure to seek an arrest warrant in the interim. Yet so long as warrantless home arrests
are viewed in the context of search and seizure law (see text accompanying notes 50-71 in a), the
question whether ample time and the absence of exigent circumstances might have made procure-
ment of a warrant reasonable in this case is relevant. See United States v. United States Dist.
Court, 407 U.S. 297,315-16 (1972); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). The Payton
Court did not speak to this point, proabably because the entries to arrest were invalid on other
grounds. Cf., eg., Godfrey v. United States, 358 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1966) and United States v.
Wilson, 342 F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1965) (delay in obtaining a warrant invalidated the arrests only
when delay was unjustified and defendant actually was prejudiced).
16. N.Y. CRaIs. PROc. LAW § 140.15 (McKinney 1971) permitted an officer to make a war-
rantless entry and arrest on premises where he reasonably believed a suspect to be present, pro-
vided that he gave or made a reasonable attempt to give notice of his authority and purpose, as
required by N.Y. Caim. PROC. LAW § 120.80(4), (5) (1971). 45 N.Y.2d at 307, 380 N.E.2d at 227,
408 N.Y.S.2d at 398. Notice was not required if the officer had reasonable cause to believe it
would (1) prompt the defendant's attempted escape, (2) endanger another's life or person, or
(3) prompt the destruction or secretion of evidence. Id. Section 120.80 further authorized the
officer's peaceful or forcible entry if he was not admitted after giving such notice.
17. Because of the son's age, the officers' entry was nonconsensual under the voluntariness
test of Scbneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). See notes 113-119 infra and accompany-
ing text.
18. Defendant objected that the arrest was vitiated by the delayed announcement of purpose,
but his motion to suppress was denied and the arrest declared generally valid. 45 N.Y.2d at 307,




The New York Court of Appeals affirmed both Payton's and Riddick's
convictions and implicitly found the authorizing statutes constitutional.20 Re-
jecting the appellants' contention that "any proper sense of constitutional sym-
metry" mandated the same warrant or exigent-circumstances requirement for
home arrest as for search and seizure,21 the court of appeals accepted the va-
lidity of a more stringent standard for search and seizure. This acceptance was
premised on a view of the warrantless search as potentially more intrusive in
its breadth and intensity than the warrantless home arrest,22 on a refusal to
differentiate between the intrusiveness of a permissible warrantless public ar-
rest23 and that of a warrantless home arrest,24 and on the notion that the pub-
lie's interest in apprehending a suspect exceeds its interest in obtaining
evidence.
25
In Payton v. New York the Supreme Court reversed the New York Court
of Appeals and held that nonconsensual home entries made to effect a routine
arrest are unconstitutional under the fourth amendment. The Court scruti-
nized the issue of warrantless home arrests from historical and contemporary
vantage points. Looking to common law and colonial history, it sought the
Framers' intent in drafting the fourth amendment and determined that the
amendment's specific language protected people as well as objects from war-
rantless seizures. After considering recent judicial treatment of warrantless
public arrests and of searches and seizures, the Court classified warrantless
home arrests with the latter.
The question of the propriety of warrantless home arrests has a long and
confusing history, extending from early common law commentators, through
colonial Americans' hatred of writs of assistance, to more recent case law con-
cerning warrantless search and seizure and arrest. But an historical under-
standing of the common law illuminates that question only insofar as the
authors of the fourth amendment subscribed to the dictates of common law,
and only if their intent is accepted as binding on a present reading of the
amendment. To some extent, these two considerations are intertwined. When
history indicates a consistent attitude towards a challenged practice, that prac-
tice is less likely to bow to the winds of judicial change, particularly if the
practice accords with current policy.26 But when the common law is ambigu-
ous, as in the case of warrantless home arrest, history neither delineates the
Framers' intent nor impresses us with the weight of its independent authority.
The historical confusion regarding the acceptability of warrantless home
arrests was evident even in two of the earliest English cases that touched the
20. Id. at 315, 380 N.E.2d at 232, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
21. Id. at 309, 380 N.E.2d at 228, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 399.
22. Id. at 310, 380 N.E.2d at 229, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
23. The Supreme Court validated warrantless public arrests in United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411 (1976).
24. 45 N.Y.2d at 310, 380 N.E.2d at 229, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
25. Id.
26. See, ag., Watson v. United States, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) and text accompanying notes 124-
30infra. But see 423 U.S. at 438-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (the common law history of warrant-
less public arrests is misread and misapplied by the Court's "unblinking literalism").
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issue.27 These cases were concerned primarily with the imperatives of notice
and demand for entry, and neither made clear whether an arrest warrant or
exigent circumstances were present. 28 Common law commentators addressed
the issue of warrantless home arrest more directly but with no less ambiguity.
Although neither Coke nor Hawkins approved of entry to arrest on mere sus-
picion, 29 Blackstone clearly permitted it.30 And while Hale's remarks appear
to accord with those of Blackstone, they arise in a context analogous to hot
pursuit, 3 1 a circumstance under which even Coke and Hawkins sanctioned the
breaking of doors to arrest.
32
27. Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603) and Burdett v. Abbot, 104 Eng. Rep. 501
(K.B. 1811) (an officer of the Crown may "break open the house" in order to arrest).
28. In Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603), it was unclear whether entry was pur-
suant to a warrant, from the mention of both a "writ" and "process" in the context of the court's
discussion:
[Tihe K's officer may break the house to apprehend the felon, and that for two reasons:
1. For the commonwealth, for it is for the commonwealth to apprehend felons. 2. In
every felony the King has an interest, and where the King has an interest the writ is non
omaittaspropter aliquam liberiatem; and so the liberty or privilege of a house doth not
hold against the King.
77 Eng. Rep. at 196-97.
In all cases where the King is a party, the sheriff may (if the doors be not open) break the
party's house, either to arrest him or to do other execution of the K'sprocess, if otherwise
he cannot enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming and
to make request to open doors; ... for the law without a default in the owner abhors the
destruction or breaking of any house (which is for the habitation and safety of man) by
which great damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party, when no default is in
him; for perhaps he did not know of the process, of which, if he had notice, is to be
presumed that he would obey it ....
77 Eng. Rep. at 195-96 (emphasis added).
In Burdett v. Abbot, it was clear that a warrant had been issued for the arrest of plaintiff-
"[The House of Commons ordered that] plaintiff should be committed to the Tower for his said
offense, and that the Speaker should issue his warrant accordingly. . . ." 104 Eng. Rep. at 560.
See generally Blakey, The Rule of.Announcement and UnlawfulEn/ry Miller v. United States and
Kerr v. California, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 499 (1964).
29. [A] justice of the peace may make his warrant for the salvation of the peace, meaning
to assist the party that knoweth or hath suspicion of the felony. But in this case neither
the constable, nor any other can break open any house for the apprehension of the party
suspected or charged with the felony, for it is in law the arrest of the party that hath the
knowledge of suspicion, who cannot break open any house.
3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 177 (1817).
"But where one lies under a probable suspicion only, and is not indicted, it seems the better
opinion at this day, that no one can justify the breaking open doors in order to apprehend him." 2
W. HAWKNs, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 139 (1788).
30. "[I]n case of felony actually committed, or a dangerous wounding whereby felony is
likely to ensue, he [the constable] may upon probable suspicion arrest the felon; and for that
purpose is authorized.. . to break open doors. ... 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES OF
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 292 (1818).
31. A passage permitting the constable to break doors to arrest, after notice and demand for
entry, iffie suspected the accused felon "on probable grounds," proceeded to describe the suspect
who "flees and takes house." 2 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 92 (1778).
32. And yet it is to be understood, that if one be indicted of felony, the sherif may by
process thereupon after denyall made ... break the house for his apprehension, or
upon hue and cry of one that is slain or wounded, so as he is in danger of death, or
robbed, the king's officer that pursueth may (if denyall be made) break a house to appre-
hend the delinquent.
COKE, supra note 29 at 176.
[W]here a person authorized to arrest another who is sheltered in a house, is denied
quietly to enter into it, in order to take him; it seems generally to be agreed, that he may
[Vol. 59
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Nor does history indicate clearly whether the Framers intended the fourth
amendment to forbid all unreasonable seizures, implicitly including unreason-
able seizures without a warrant with the more explicit restrictions on those
with a warrant; or whether they intended to curtail only the abusive general
warrant,33 accepting the persistence of such warrantless seizures as arguably
were permitted at common law.34 In the latter case, knock and notice and the
officer's suspicions presumably would suffice as "reasonable" for the purpose
of the fourth amendment. History also leaves unclear whether the amend-
ment's restrictions of searches and seizures protect all objects seized, whether
they are persons or things.
The Court concluded in Payton that the first clause of the fourth amend-
ment speaks plainly to any unreasonable warrantless search and seizure, in-
cluding that of persons. 35 This holding rests on an expansive perception of the
fourth amendment as protecting the sanctity of the home and justifying an
expectation of privacy in the home, a perception for which the intrusiveness of
arrest and that of a search for objects is fundamentally the same.
36
Clearly the Court lacked sound historical evidence that this interpretation
of the amendment was in accord with original intent. Thus, the Court's con-
cern with the Framers' intent revealed not so much an affinity for historical
roots as a desire to find support for its holding in the amendment's language.
Indeed, the Court's admitted bias favors a dynamic Constitution, not one
shackled to the attitudes and experiences of the founding fathers.37 In divin-
justify breaking open the doors in the following instances:. . . Fifthly. . .[w]here one
known to have committed a treason or felony or to. . .have given another a dangerous
wound, is pursued either with or without a warrant, by a constable or private person.
HAWKINS, supra note 29 at 138-39.
33. There is no question that the colonists hated writs of assistance (general warrants to
search aimed at apprehending smugglers) as much for their permanence (they remained in effect
for the life of the monarch) as for their frequent use. The writ was not itself a search warrant but a
summons to the constable to keep the peace while customs officers searched pursuant to their
established authority. J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 41 (1966).
There is some authority, however, that the writs of assistance were used both to search and to
arrest. See 14 AM. CRIm. L. REV. 193, 212 n.129 (1976) (citing E. FISHER, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
3-5 (1970)).
34. Warrantless public arrests, for example, were permitted at common law. See United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418-22 (1976).
35. 445 U.S. at 585.
36. Id. at 588-89. To this end, the Court cited G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S.
338 (1977); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); and Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), as cases that establish rules protecting search and seizure of objects on
private premises. Id. at 585-89. Referring extensively to two lower court decisions that apply
these rules to warrantless home arrest, United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 913 (1978) and Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en bane), the
Court approved a view of the fourth amendment that shields persons and objects equally from
unreasonable government intrusion. Id. at 587-89.
37. See, eg., 445 U.S. at 591 n.33 (calling attention to the difference between rules for search
and seizure at common law and what has evolved in the modern American legal context, empha-
sizing that the Constitution has not been and should not be frozen by practices existing at its
inception); People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 324, 380 N.E.2d 224, 238, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395, 409
(1978) (dissenting opinion) (rejecting antiquity and legislative unanimity as determinative where a
"grave constitutional question" is at issue); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415
(1819) (referring to "a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be
1981]
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ing the Framers' intent, the Payton Court thus sought to indicate the breadth
of the amendment's language-that it restricts not only abuses created by gen-
eral warrants but also unreasonable searches and seizures not under general
warrants.
38
In addition to an historical analysis of warrantless home arrests, a central
concern of the Payton Court was to reconcile its holding with the constitution-
ality of warrantless public arrests. Spurred by the New York Court of Ap-
peals' reliance on United States v. Watson as a basis for its decision in People v.
Payton, the Payton Court proceeded to distinguish Watson and show why it
was not determinative of the issue in Payton.39 United States v. Watson was
the first Supreme Court case unequivocally declaring warrantless public ar-
rests to be permissible under the fourth amendment. A postal inspector, who
was authorized by federal statute4° to make warrantless arrests when he had
reasonable grounds to believe a person had committed a felony, arrested Wat-
son in a restaurant for possession of stolen credit cards. A personal search
proved fruitless, but Watson consented to a search of his car,4 1 where officers
found the stolen cards.42 The Watson majority pointed to the validity of war-
rantless public arrests not only under the Postal Service statute but also under
other federal statutes and under similar statutes in most states.43 This statu-
adapted to the various crires of human affairs" and not one intended to have "the properties of a
legal code") (emphasis supplied). See also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) ("It was
enough for [the Framers of the Constitution] to realize or to hope that they had created an organ-
ism .... The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not
merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago."). See generally Note, Warrantless Entry to
Arrest: A P'ractical Solution to a Fourth Amendment Problem, 1978 U. ILL. L. F. 655, 661 on the
evolutionary nature of Supreme Court-created law.
38. To this end, the Court noted the rejection of James Madison's one-clause draft, which
was more pointedly aimed only at restricting the issuance of warrants:
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and
their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not par-
ticularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized.
445 U.S. at 584 n.22. That rejection, the Court indicated, was evidence of the purposeful adoption
of the present two-clause amendment. Id. at 584-85. Actually, the two-clause version survived by
historical fluke. Its promulgator ignored the vote of the House majority not to change the phrase
"by warrants issuing" to the phrase "and no warrants shall issue," and reported his amendment as
the final version. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 33, at 42. Nevertheless, this version was passed by the
House and Senate and ratified in its present form by the states. Thus, rather than remaining
restricted to the response to general warrants that begot it, the fourth amendment is open to the
Payton Court's broader interpretation. The first clause, said the Court, protects a basic right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures; the second clause, meant to curb the sweeping
power of general warrants, requires warrants to be particular and supported by probable cause.
445 U.S. at 584.
39. This task was particularly important, given the impact on fourth amendment law many
expected from Watson. When Watson was first reported, some feared that it would draw warrant-
less home arrests into its vortex. For example, Justice Marshall, dissenting, argued for arrest as a
form of seizure which should merit identical fourth amendment protections, and for the Court's
historic preference for a warrant, which preference was rendered toothless by the majority deci-
sion.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3061(a)(3) (1969).
41. The request to search Watson's car was preceded by Miranda warnings and followed by
an admonition that anything found would be used against him. 423 U.S. at 413.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 421-22.
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tory validity was itself substantiated by both recent judicial precedent44 and
early common law.
45
A concurring opinion in Watson stressed that differing historical back-
grounds underlay routine warrantless arrests in public and warrantless
searches and seizures, therefore justifying the anomalous treatment of each
under the fourth amendment.4 6 Indeed, an analysis of all factors supporting
the Watson Court's approval of warrantless public arrest does not carry over
to warrantless home arrests. Regarding warrantless home arrests, the author-
ity of common law commentators is ambiguous and contradictory;4 7 state au-
thority for warrantless entries, while still representing the majority position, is
being eroded through state court decisions;48 and congressional approval is
virtually nonexistent. 49 Thus the Payton majority adequately justified its re-
fusal to apply the logic of Watson to warrantless home arrests.
Because Payton put home entry to arrest in a class with entry to search,
those cases developing fourth amendment protections for search and seizure
are vital to an understanding of how home arrest will now be treated. The
license for law officers to enter a dwelling either to arrest or to search without a
warrant has undergone progressive limitation by Supreme Court decisions.
Two early cases concerned with searches incident to warrantless home arrests
focused on the validity of the search rather than on the arrest. Johnson v.
United States5 ° held that an entry to arrest with neither warrant nor reason-
44. Justice Powell commented in his concurring opinion that the cases cited by Justice White
did not squarely face the issue of warrantless arrest but were concerned only with the limited issue
of probable cause. Id. at 426-27 n.l. (Powell, J., concurring). See also id. at 437 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
45. Id. at 418-19.
46. Id. at 429-30 (Powell, 3., concurring).
47. The Court indicated that, while Coke and Hawkins plainly declared warrantless home
arrests to be illegal, Blackstone clearly said the opposite. Yet Blackstone's authority rested on the
study of Hale, whose own remarks on the subject were ambiguous and could be read as being
restricted to instances of hot pursuit. See 445 U.S. at 595-96 n.41. The Court noted that other
common law authority is similarly unclear or unauthoritative. Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194
(K.B. 1603), was "equivocal dictum" and perhaps referred to entry pursuant to a writ (445 U.S. at
592); and a Year Book statement that, for bare suspicion of felony, a man may break house, was
"extrajudicial opinion" (445 U.S. at 596). See generally notes 27-32 supra.
Justice White, dissenting in Payton, insisted that the majority's treatment of common law was
cursory and distorted. He saw commentators having a more consistent attitude towards warrant-
less home arrests on mere suspicion. Yet he stressed that the propriety of warrantless arrests on
mere suspicion, even in public, was not definitively established until 1790, implying that less
weight should be put on common law than on the Framers' intent that the fourth amendment
protect chiefly against abuses of the warrant power. 445 U.S. at 607-08 (dissenting opinion).
48. Id. at 598-99.
49. Id. at 601. Justice White disagreed, pointing to the general authority granted federal
agents by 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1969) to make warrantless arrests on probable cause alone, which he
presumed to include warrantless arrests in the home. He further referred to the explicit provisions
in 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1970) for entry pursuant to a search warrant. That statute has been inter-
preted also to authorize entry to arrest on probable cause in lieu of a warrant. See Miller v.
United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306 (1958). Justice White concluded that statutes of this type are not
meant to derogate from what he saw as the historically broader authority of officers to arrest
without a warrant-an authority he presumed Congress recognized. 445 US. at 614-15 (dissent-
ing opinion).
50. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
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able cause to believe the suspect guilty, as required by state statute,51 cannot
be justified by subsequent discovery of evidence in a search incident to that
arrest.52 Ker v. Calfornia53 similarly noted that for a warrantless entry and
search incident to arrest to be valid, officers must be armed with probable
cause 54 and their mode of entry authorized by statute.5 5 But the Ker Court
held that when the facts fit a statutory or judicial exception for exigent circum-
stances, an otherwise illegal entry and subsequent search is reasonable under
the fourth amendment.56 Chimel v. California,57 also involving a search inci-
dent to an arrest, held that such a search must not extend beyond "the arres-
tee's person and the area 'within his immediate control' "-namely, the area
into which he might reach.58 Presumably this injunction bears on any entry to
arrest, even one prompted by exigent circumstances, so long as the suspect is in
view and the area within his control is thereby defined.5 9
Several fourth amendment principles have emerged from a line of cases
following Johnson and Ker that develop further the constitutional parameters
of warrantless entry for search and seizure. 60 First is the notion of the home as
a "constitutionally protected area," 61 a concept expanded in Katz v. United
States62 to include any area where a person has an "actual (subjective) expec-
tation of privacy. . . that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' ,,63
51. Id. at 15 n.5.
52. In language directed at warrantless searches, the Court said that if the existence of evi-
dence sufficient to support a magistrate's warrant could authorize officers to make a warrantless
search in the absence of "exceptional circumstances," the amendment would be reduced to a "nul-
lity." Id. at 14.
53. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
54. Id. at 34-35. Probable cause, the standard of reasonableness for both arrests and search
and seizure, has been defined only vaguely by the Court. Probable cause for arrests must be based
on information "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] has committed
or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
55. 374 U.S. at 37. In Ker the officers' unannounced entry violated the applicable statute.
Id.
56. Id. at 41-42. The vital role of the authorizing statute was stressed by the Court in distin-
guishing Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958), where a warrantless entry preceded by the
officers' inaudible announcement was declared illegal for not meeting District of Columbia statu-
tory knock-and-notice requirements. Id. at 305-06. Because exceptions for exigent circumstances
neither existed in District of Columbia law nor were argued before the Court, however, the arrest
and search were not legally justified. 374 U.S. at 40.
57. 395 U.S. 752 (1968). In Chimel the arrest was valid.
58. Id. at 763.
59. Where the suspect is absent, however, Chime! would not control. See Dorman v. United
States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc) and text accompanying notes 79-93 infra.
60. See generally Rotenberg and Tanzer, Searchingfor the Person to be Seized, 35 OHIO ST.
L.J. 56, 70 & nn.63-65 (1974); 14 AM. CRim. L. REv. 193 (1976); Note, supra note 37.
61. "At the very core [of the fourth amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
62. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
63. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Even the earliest judicial interpretations of the four-
teenth amendment similarly expressed its protection of a right to privacy as its keystone: "It is not
the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes.., the offense; but
it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private prop-
erty, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense .
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
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Second is the requirement of a warrant. That a search of premises without a
warrant is per se unreasonable, absent exigent circumstances, was a rule an-
nounced in Katz and reiterated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire.64 Related to
the warrant requirement is a third principle, namely that a search generally is
not consensual when conducted under a warrant. 65 Fourth is the idea that
exigent circumstances generally should be limited to those instances when
quick police action is necessary to prevent dangers inherent in a suspect's at-
tempted resistance or escape (including "hot pursuit"), 66 to otherwise protect
the officer,67 or to preserve evidence from destruction.68 While these princi-
ples logically could have been applied as easily to warrantless home arrests as
to search and seizure, the Court prior to Payton persistently had kept the is-
sues separate by either avoiding such application, 69 pointing out significant
distinctions,70 or restricting such application to dicta.
71
Three lower court cases,72 however, declared warrantless entries absent
64. 403 U.S. 443, 478, 481 (1971). The warrant requirement has also been derived from a
balancing of the public's interest in intruding against the right to privacy promised by the fourth
amendment. See generally United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-21
(1972); Comment, The Constitutionality of Warrantless Home Arrests, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1550
(1978); Comment, Forcible Entry to Effect a Warrantless Arrest-The Eroding Protection of the
Castle, 82 DICK. L. Rav. 167 (1977); Note, supra note 37.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), which held that a warrantless administra-
tive search in nonemergency situations violated the fourth amendment, threw more weight to the
constitutional right, stating that one must ask "not whether the public interest justifies the...
search in question, but whether.. . the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the
governmental purpose behind the search." Id. at 533. Even more extreme in favoring the consti-
tutional right over the public's interest is the following:
The warrant requirement. . . is not an inconvenience to be somehow "weighed" against
the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should be, an important working part of our
machinery of government, operating as a matter of course to check the "well-intentioned
but mistakenly over-zealous exdecutive officers" who are a part of any system of law en-
forcement.
403 U.S. at 481 (quoting Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921)).
65. Whether there is consent to a search is determined by judicial tests. See Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (the "totality of all the circumstances" test); text accompa-
nying notes 117-20 infra.
66. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16
n.7 (1948).
67. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972). See also Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 n.19 (1967).
68. 407 U.S. at 318.
69. See, eg., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 n.6 (1976): "[T]he still unsettled
question posed in that part of the Coolidge opinion was 'whether and under what circumstances
an officer may enter a suspect's home to make a warrantless arrest.' Watson's midday public
arrest does not present that question." See also note 2 supra.
70. For example, Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Watson indicated that, while an ar-
rest is "quintessentially a seizure [and] it would seem that the constitutional provision should
impose the same limitations upon arrests that it does upon searches... , history and experience"
for warrantless public arrests compel a different conclusion. 423 U.S. at 428-29.
71. See, e.g., 403 U.S. at 477-78:
It is clear, then, that the notion that the warrantless entry of a man's house in order to
arrest him on probable cause isperse legitimate is in fundamental conflict with the basic
principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a man's house
without a warrant are per se unreasonable in the absence of some one of a number of
well defined "exigent circumstances."
72. United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d
385 (D.C. Cir. 1970); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976).
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exigent circumstances unconstitutional and refused to accept disparate fourth
amendment analyses for arrest and for search and seizure. Seeing separate
rules for each kind of intrusion as "incongruous" 73 and anomalous, 74 these
cases relied substantially on those principles developed for warrantless
searches and seizures in analyzing situations of warrantless entries and ar-
rests. 7
5
In Dorman v. United States,76 a case highlighted by the Payton Court,7 7
police were investigating a robbery committed the same day. Armed with
probable cause but no warrant, they knocked and announced their identity at
the home of the suspect. The suspect's mother admitted them so that they
could verify her averment of his absence, and, while searching the apartment
for him, the officers discovered evidence incriminating him in the robbery.78
Excusing the entry and search due to "urgent need," Judge Leventhal ana-
lyzed the entry in search and seizure terms-protection of privacy and the
general requirement of a warrant.79 Apart from those cases where speed is
essential, "the constitutional safeguard that . . assures citizens the privacy
and security of their homes unless a judicial officer determines that it must be
overridden, is applicable not only in case of entry to search for property, but
also in case of entry to arrest a suspect."80 From this premise Judge Leventhal
concluded: "Subject to exceptions for circumstances, that constitutional prin-
ciple prohibits invasion of the privacy of the home by unconsented entry un-
less need therefor has been determined by a warrant."81 The Dorman court
catalogued a list of factors pertinent to establishing when urgency reasonably
73. Moreover, it is incongruous to pay homage to the considerable body of law that has
developed to protect an individual's belongings from unreasonable search and seizure in
his home, and at the same time assert that identical considerations do not operate to
safeguard the individual himself in the same setting.
16 Cal. 3d at 275, 545 P.2d at 1340, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
74. United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412,419 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting Justice Powell's concur-
ring opinion in Watson). See text accompanying note 46 supra.
75. The analogy of search and seizure and home arrests for fourth amendment purposes
appeared early, in Coolidge (see note 71 supra) and in Watson (see note 70 supra). Often called
the symmetry argument, this analogy is not merely an aesthetic argument nor a simple derivation
from the plain language of the amendment. Rather, it recognizes that both intrusions share essen-
tially the same character-they threaten to violate an expectation of privacy deserving of protec-
tion. The argument further recognizes that the desire expressed in search and seizure rules for a
balance of privacy interests and public policy, stemming as much from a distrust of police prac-
tices as from a concern for the protection of society, implicitly applies to arrests. Nevertheless, the
symmetry argument has been rejected on the ground that one intrusion is "more extensive and
more intensive" than the other and therefore not deserving of the same constitutional protection.
People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 380 N.E.2d 244, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395. For the formal rather than
substantive nature of its rationale, see Note, supra note 37 at 673 and n.101. Butsee note 115 and
text accompanying notes 111-15 infra.
76. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
77. 445 U.S. at 575 n.4, 587-88.
78. 435 F.2d at 387-88.
79. Id. at 389-90. Judge Leventhal quoted Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948),
on the fourth amendment protection of the right to privacy in the home, a right which should yield
to government intrusion only at the decision of a judicial officer; and he cited Camara v. Munici-
pal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), on the vitality of the warrant requirement, and Chimel v. Califor-
ia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), on the restricted scope of a search incident to arrest. 435 F.2d at 390.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 391.
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demands foregoing a warrant: (1) the gravity of the offense, including
whether violence is involved; (2) a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is
armed; (3) a "clear showing of probable cause" that the suspect committed the
offense; (4) "a strong reason to believe the suspect is in the premises"; (5) the
likelihood of the suspect's imminent escape; (6) the reasonableness of entry,
including whether force is necessary; and (7) whether the entry is made during
daylight hours.82 Although the Payton Court did not mention this list, it has
impressed other courts83 as a reasonable effort to clarify the parameters of
exigent circumstances.
The impact of Dorman was apparent in two other lower court decisions
based on the same symmetrical view of fourth amendment protections for
search and seizure and for arrest. People v. Ramey8 4 held that a warrantless
home arrest absent an emergency or consent to enter violated the California
constitution's analogue to the fourth amendment. The Ramey court anticipat-
ed Payton by noting that Supreme Court dicta leaned towards the conclusion
that the fourth amendment's foci are the protection of privacy and the impor-
tance of obtaining a warrant. In United States v. Reed,85 involving a delayed
narcotics arrest in the suspect's home,86 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that absent a warrant or exigent circumstances, the
fourth amendment prohibits federal law officers from entering the home of a
suspect to effect a felony arrest, statutory authority87 notwithstanding. The
Reed opinion referred extensively to Dorman and Ramey and to search and
seizure cases relying on (1) expectations of privacy, especially in the home,88
(2) restrictions on the scope of permissible warrantless government inva-
sions,89 and (3) such factors creating exigent circumstances as those deline-
ated in Dorman.9°
The treatment of Payton issues by the lower courts provides background
not only for understanding Payton itself, but also for evaluating the problems
left unresolved by the Court. The Court's new perception of home entry to
arrest as logically related to fourth amendment search and seizure law will
82. Id. at 392-93.
83. See, eg., United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 424 (2d Cir. 1978).
84. 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976). In Ramey a burglary victim's
own investigation convinced police officers that defendant was guilty, if not of possessing stolen
goods, then of having at one time received them. The officers made a warrantless entry in accord-
ance with standard police practice and arrested defendant, seizing a weapon within his reach and
drugs in plain view. The court held that the evidence should have been suppressed, as exigent
circumstances did not excuse the intrusion. Id. at 275-76, 545 P.2d at 1340-4, 127 Cal. Rptr. at
636-37.
85. 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978).
86. The arrest occurred more than two months after probable cause had been established
through arranged purchases by undercover agents. Id. at 415.
87. The arrest in Reed was within the scope of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970, as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1977). 572 F.2d at 417 n.3.
88. Id. at 422 (citing United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1966); and Miller v. United
States, 357 U.S. 301 (1957)).
89. Id. at 423 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)).
90. Id. at 424.
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have consequences for legislatures, for police practices, and for citizens gener-
ally. One consequence of Payton is immediately apparent: all state and fed-
eral statutes authorizing routine, warrantless, nonconsensual home entry and
arrest are now to that extent unconstitutional.91 State court decisions sanc-
tioning such statutes are overruled implicitly.92
Several more troublesome consequences follow from requiring a warrant
for nonexigent home arrests. While inanimate objects of a search cannot es-
cape while officers seek a warrant,93 people are more mobile and their loca-
tions are consequently less predictable. This creates a potential problem
involving police practices. The State of New York argued in Payton v. New
York that a warrant requirement would frustrate police work by (1) pressur-
ing police to make warrant requests and arrests too hurriedly, resulting in rub-
ber-stamped warrants and careless arrests; 94 (2) wasting police resources by,
for example, necessitating stakeouts of the suspect's dwelling while a warrant
is being obtained;95 (3) penalizing officers who plan deliberately; 96 and
(4) causing more injuries. 97 But the Payton majority said there is no evidence
in those states where warrantless home arrests have been declared unconstitu-
tional9" that a warrant requirement would be debilitating.99 If the reasonable-
91. Included are statutes in 25 states permitting forcible entries to make any lawful arrest,
those in six states permitting forcible entries with a warrant or for a felony arrest, and those of two
states authorizing entry to arrest for felonies. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIONMENT PROCE-
DUPE, app. XI, 696-97 (1975). North Carolina is in the last category: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401
(1978 & Supp. 1979) permits warrantless entry to arrest if the officer has probable cause to believe
the suspect committed a felony, id. at § 15A-401(b); reasonable grounds to believe he will evade
arrest if not apprehended immediately, id. at § 15A-401, Official Commentary (b); reasonable
grounds to believe that the suspect is present, id. at § 15A-401(e)(1)(b); or when the officer has
given or has made a reasonable attempt to give notice of his authority and purpose, unless there is
reasonable cause to believe such notice could endager human life, id. at § 15A-401(e)(l)(c).
The ALI MODEL CODE, supra, will be affected as well. Rules for nighttime entries accord
with Payton (permissible with warrant or necessitous circumstances only), but rules for warrant-
less daytime entries, requiring a felony suspect or necessity plus prior notice and demand for entry
unless escape or destruction of evidence might result, will have to reflect the stricter guidelines
now required only for nighttime entries. Id. at § 120.6.
92. This would seem to apply to cases such as State v. Perez, 277 So. 2d 778 (Fla.), cer.
denied, 414 U.S. 1064 (1973), which held that a home arrest made on probable cause in accord
with statutory criteria was valid even though there was ample time to obtain a warrant. Because
the statute did not require exigent circumstances to justify this mode of arrest, the entry and
seizure of evidence in plain view was held valid.
93. This is obviously not the case where a possessor's suspicions are alerted or the evidence is
likely to deteriorate with delay.
94. See Note, supra note 37, at 667 n.74 (noting that arrest warrants commonly have been
issued routinely without adequate review of the complaint).
95. 445 U.S. 573, 619 (1980) (White, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 602 n.55. It is unclear what the state had in mind here; it would seem that deliber-
ate planning should include obtaining a warrant.
97. Id. The state's fear that more injuries would result from a delay should be allayed by the
license inherent in the exigent circumstances exception, which includes dangerous situations. See
also Comment, The Constitutionaliy of Warrantless HomeArrests, supra note 64, at 1559-62 (dis-
missing arguments against requiring a warrant for nonexigent home arrests based on "inherent
danger" and "risk of flight"); Comment, Forcible Entry to Effect a Warran/essArrest-The Erod
ing Protection of the Castle, supra note 64, at 182-83 (potential burden on law enforcement and
possibility of probable cause becoming "stale" unlikely to outweigh privacy interests); and Note,
supra note 37, at 666-68 (rejects similar arguments based on anticipated constraints on police and
court routines).
98. 445 U.S. at 599-602. See also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 448-49 (1976) (Mar-
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ness test is to be a balance between public interest and a right to privacy,100 a
more substantial case for the obstruction of law enforcement methods must be
made.
A second problem is apparent in what the Payton Court called the im-
plicit authority conveyed by an arrest warrant to enter a home "when there is
reason to believe the suspect is within."'' This problem is of course not new
to cases of entry under a valid arrest warrant. However, since the Payton
Court, in accord with long-existing practice,'0 2 required no demonstration
before a magistrate that the suspect is probably on the premises, 10 3 it is un-
clear whether "reason to believe the suspect is within" imposes any meaning-
ful standard. A zealous officer with only an arrest warrant might conclude
from an unanswered knock and a car in the driveway or from a light left on
that the suspect is hiding at home. A court might hold that the officer had
"reason to believe" the suspect was within and therefore that the officer was
free to enter and search anywhere a person might hide, seizing whatever evi-
dence he found in plain view. 14 Thus, the potential exists for a general war-
shall, J., dissenting) (noting that the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which requires prior demon-
stration of evidence for arrest warrants to issue, nevertheless has remained efficient).
99. Nor will the decision necessarily force a change in police practices. In North Carolina,
Burley B. Mitchell, State Crime Control Secretary, has said that he sees nothing alarming in Pay-
ton, since police in North Carolina generally obtain arrest warrants anyway. Raleigh News and
Observer, April 16, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
100. See note 64 supra.
101. 445 U.S. at 603.
102. See, eg., Hawkins v. Commonwealth, 53 Ky. 395, 396 (1 B. Mon. 1854):
The right to break open the outer door to make the entrance of course includes the right
to break open the doors of the different rooms and chambers in the house to make a
thorough search throughout the premises; and though the defendant in the process be
not found, or shown to be in the place of his dwelling at the time, yet such entrance and
search of the officer, having valid criminal process in his hands, would not therefore be
unlawful, or make him a trespasser... ;
State v. Shook, 224 N.C. 728, 733, 32 S.E.2d 329, 332 (1944) (quoting State v. Mooring, 115 N.C.
709, 711, 20 S.E. 182, 182-83 (1894)); "If the officer have valid process in his hands, he does not
become a trespasser ab initio if he fail to find the accused in the house after breaking the door."
103. Indeed, as the Court noted, this would be virtually impossible, the sworn facts being too
ephemeral to keep the warrant from going stale. 445 U.S. at 602. A warrant goes stale when the
original facts supporting probable cause have been discredited by new information or altered
circumstances. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 432 n.5 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
Those who discuss the unlikelihood of an arrest warrant going stale are speaking of probable
cause that the suspect committed the crime, not probable cause as to his whereabouts. See, e.g.,
Comment, Forcible Entry to Effect a Warrantless Arrest-The Eroding Protection of the Castle,
supra note 64, at 183 (because "probable cause [for an arrest warrant] is predicated on the imme-
diate suspicion of an ineradicable crime, it necessarily continues indefinitely, so long as no excul-
patory facts are discovered in the interim"). See generally 14 AM. CRam. L. REv. 193, 203 n.71
(1976).
104. The facts of Theodore Payton's case illustrate this scenario. See text accompanying notes
8-13 supra. The New York Court of Appeals recognized that whether the police overstepped the
bounds of entry to arrest was a legitimate question, but held that it was an issue of fact decided by
the suppression court and appellate division and was beyond review by the Court of Appeals. 45
N.Y.2d 300, 301, 380 N.E.2d 224, 230, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395, 401 (1978). See also Rotenburg and
Tanzer, supra note 60, at 66-67 (discussing United States v. Retolaza, 398 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1968),
where entry without a search warrant to verify that the suspect was not present was upheld). The
danger of overstepping is of course restricted by Chimel when the suspect is present. See text
accompanying notes 57-59 supra.
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rantless search under the authority of a less exacting arrest warrant.105
However, two checks exist that may prevent such excesses. One is the ubiqui-
tous requirement that any nonexigent forcible entry be preceded by knock and
notice. An unanswered knock with no certain sign that anyone is present
should leave no "reason to believe the suspect is within," and the officer, ide-
ally, would not enter. The second, possibly more effective, check is common
sense. An officer whose genuine aim is arrest will want to be certain of the
suspect's presence before exercising his warrant, for an ineffectual entry may
alert the suspect and lead to his escape or the destruction of evidence. Despite
these potential checks, the Court left a loophole to fourth amendment abuse
that could have been closed by requiring demonstrable'0 6 reason to believe
that the suspect is at home.
The Payton Court expressly chose not to consider a third problem,
namely, exactly what circumstances qualify as exigent other than an "emer-
gency or dangerous situation." 10 7 The Court's reluctance to be more precise
perhaps resulted as much from widespread acceptance of a loose definition 08
as from the difficulty of formulating a more exact test.109 Yet for the phrase
"exigent circumstances" to be meaningful, it is necessary to test the circum-
105. The possibility of a general warrantless search might have an especially insidious effect
on third persons. While Payton left unsettled an officer's authority to enter the home of a third
person in pursuit of a suspect, 445 U.S. at 583, the question should be affected by the Court's
renewed emphasis on the sanctity of private premises. Rotenburg and Tanzer discuss intrusions
into homes of third parties under the authority of an arrest warrant and note the half-hearted
attempt of the American Law Institute to provide a voluntary alternative to this practice (the ALI
provides for a search-for-person warrant requiring a prior showing of probable cause to believe
the suspect is in a particular location). Rotenburg and Tanzer, supra note 60, at 67-68 and 58 n. 10.
A similar procedure to search for a person to be arrested is described in FED. R. CIUM. PROC. 41
(a)-(c) (Supp. 1980), but no restraints on the breadth of a search pursuant to an arrest warrant
alone are proposed. Some lower court decisions provide a judicial check on intrusions into the
privacy ofthird persons. E.g. Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d'333, 333 (3d Cir. 1974) (law enforcement
officers "may not constitutionally enter the home of a private individual to search for another
person, though he be named in a valid arrest warrant in their possession, absent probable cause to
believe the suspect is presently within at the time"). See Wallace v. King, 626 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir.
1980). See also the recent Supreme Court decision in Steagald v. United States, 49 U.S.L.W. 4418
(1981). Nevertheless, the possibility for excessive intrusion under an arrest warrant persists-not
only are Fisher v. Volz and Wallace v. King not binding beyond their jurisdictions, but they also
allow the officer to determine for himself probable cause to believe the suspect present. The pro-
tection of third persons, including members of the suspect's family, deserves a magistrate's judg-
ment that a suspect is likely to be found on the third person's premises. See Note, supra note 37,
at 675 n.113.
106. Thus an officer could be challenged at a hearing to show what led him to believe the
suspect was at home. If the officer seized evidence in plain view after an unreasonable entry to
arrest, that evidence could be suppressed under the exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). While it would be patently absurd to
apply the exclusionary rule to exclude the arrestee himself when entry occurred without reason to
believe him at home, the rule would nevertheless be an effective deterrent against entries to search
that are thinly disguised as entries to arrest.
107. 445 U.S. at 583.
108. The United States Circuit Courts' tests have ranged from a totality of the circumstances
test in United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1354-56 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836
(1978), to less stringent tests, as in United States v. Rumpf, 576 F.2d 818 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 893 (1978); United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Easter, 552 F.2d 230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977). See generally Note, supra note
37, at 676-85.
109. See text accompanying notes 110-11 infra.
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stances against several factors such as those catalogued in Dorman.' 10 Never-
theless, while the Dorman list is comprehensive, it posits no test. No minimum
number of factors qualify a situation as exigent; no standard for balancing is
suggested. Further, it is unrealistic to expect an officer faced with an apparent
emergency to take pause and ponder how the situation measures up against
Dorman's list.1 ' If the uniform protection of persons against unreasonable
searches and seizures as promised by the fourth amendment is the Court's
intention, then it would have been better to define more exactly the limits to
"exigent circumstances." Until the Court more adequately defines that phrase,
it will be subject to abuse as a general license to enter and arrest with neither
warrant nor consent; and, from another point of view, it will be a thorn in the
side of police, who seek to produce admissible evidence.
1 12
A fourth problem for the Court's new stand on home arrests is determin-
ing when consent will validate a warrantless home arrest. Consent under
search and seizure doctrine is based on voluntariness as determined from the
totality of the circumstances.1 13 This test is complicated by such nebulous fac-
tors as the nature of the officer's questions and the state of mind of the suspect
or third person assenting to entry.1 14 The suspect who is located within the
sanctity of his dwelling and is faced with the knock and announcement of
police at his door must either surrender at the threshold "voluntarily" or risk a
forcible entry on the officer's presumption that the suspect is home and hiding,
which will lead to the inevitable search incident to arrest. That such a surren-
der is consensual only in terms of a critically impaired capacity for self-deter-
mination cannot be doubted.115 The Supreme Court has added to the
110. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
111. Justice White asserted that the failure to define exigent circumstances will force police
officers to make subtle distinctions on their beats that elude even judges in their chambers, some-
times resulting in delayed arrests and other times jeopardizing the admissibility of evidence. 445
U.S. at 619 (White, J., dissenting). One reasonable suggestion for a more workable definition of
exigent circumstances proposes entry in three situations: where the suspect might escape, where
he poses an immediate danger to others, or where he will destroy evidence. Further, a time limit
of eight hours should define any need for "immediate" police action. Note, supra note 37, at 681.
112. See also Comment, Forcible Entry to Effect a Warrantless Arrest-The Eroding Protection
of the Castle, supra note 64, at 180-81, 181 n.117.
113. E.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973):
[When the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a
search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that
it [the State] demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the
result of duress or coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question of fact to be
determined from all the circumstances ....
The Schneckloth criterion for consent to search itself was based on a voluntariness test for confes-
sions. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 603 (1961).
114. "In examining all the surrounding circumstances to determine if in fact the consent to
search was coerced, account must be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as well as the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents." 412 U.S. at 229.
115. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), in which knock and notice were
deemed sufficiently coercive to vitiate the subsequent consent to enter: "[E]ntry. . . was granted
in submission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitu-
tional right." Id. at 13.
Equally problematic is the situation illustrated by Riddick, where a third person has con-
sented to entry. See text accompanying notes 14-19 supra. The consent rule in search and seizure
cases is based upon the relationship between the third person and the place being searched.
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infirmities of the consent exception by repeatedly holding that, because of the
practical value of consensual searches"16 and the duty of each citizen to aid
however he can in law enforcement,' 17 the suspect need not be advised of his
right to refuse consent.1 18 Accordingly, when consent substitutes for an arrest
warrant to permit entry in home arrests and such advice is absent, it is particu-
larly important to scrutinize the facts for signs of coercion or duress, however
subtle, so that due process will not be denied through an unintentional expo-
sure of self-incriminating evidence.1 19
A fifth problem is created by having different rules for each side of the
fine line between public and private premises. This issue was addressed in
United States v. Santana,12 0 where a warrantless arrest on probable cause was
effected in the suspect's home after a chase from the front porch into the
foyer.' 21 The Supreme Court held that, had the suspect been apprehended on
her doorstep, the arrest would have been public: there can be no reasonable
expectations of privacy once one crosses the threshold into public view.
122
Though it did not mention Santana, the Payton Court agreed with the
Santana distinction between public and private that accords with search and
seizure precedent, where that line has been drawn between objects in plain
"mhe consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against
the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared." United States v. Matlock,
415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974). Ma/lack defined common authority as resting not on
the mere property interest the third party has in the property ... [but on] mutual use of
the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so
that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the coinhabitants has the right to permit the
inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their
number might permit the common area to be searched.
Id. at 171 n.7. Thus, when the person consenting co-owns or co-inhabits the premises with the
suspect, consent to search is virtually unimpeachable. But when a small child permits entry, as in
Pdddick, consent is clearly absent and the entry must be supported by either a warrant or exigent
circumstances. Neither was present in Riddick.
Consent may be difficult to establish when police gain permission to conduct a search by
virtue of their official status. E.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-50 (1968) (no
consent when third person allowed search after officers announced they had search warrant); see
United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81, 83-84 (9th Cir. 1962) ("The consent must be 'unequivocal and
specific' and 'freely and intelligently given'.... Coercion is implicit in situations where consent
is obtained under color of the badge.. . . The government's burden is greater where consent is
claimed to have been given while the defendant is under arrest."). The Watson Court qualified
this approach when it viewed the totality of circumstances and found that the arrestee, who was
experienced with police procedure, of normal intelligence, and able to exercise free choice while
under arrest in a public place, freely consented to a search. "Mhe fact of custody alone has never
been enough in itself to demonstrate a coerced confession or consent to search." 423 U.S. at 424-
25.
116. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232 (1973).
117. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966).
118. 412 U.S. at 232. See also United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 979 (1973) and United States v. Hall, 565 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1978).
119. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
120. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
121. Id. at 40.
122. Id. at 43. When, as in Santana, escape across the doorstep is "solely a product of police
conduct," Justice Marshall would hold that circumstances thus made exigent cannot validate war-
rantless arrest. Id. at 48 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, however, found the possibility




view or in a public place and those on private premises.' 23 A significant task
for the Court in the future will be to define more precisely how the line be-
tween public and private is to be drawn.
In sum, the Court's decision in Payton v. New York puts twentieth century
judicial precedent before the precepts of history and concludes that fourth
amendment protections should be identical for warrantless home arrests and
for the search and seizure of property. The reasons for this viewpoint are two-
fold: first is the obscurity surrounding attitudes toward warrantless home ar-
rests at common law' 24 and at the time the fourth amendment was drafted.
125
While the Court generally has indicated that logic "must defer to history and
experience,"' 126 the hegemony dissolves when, as with warrantless home ar-
rests, history and experience give mixed signals rather than a steady beam of a
consistently accepted practice.' 27 Because of the current Court's reluctance to
legislate,]28 the Framers' intent is normally considered vital in construing the
Constitution; but in this instance we are left with logic alone to plumb that
intent-to determine whether the fourth amendment was meant simply as a
restriction on warrants or as a broader assertion of the right to privacy.
129
Logic leads us to presume the latter interpretation. For if the Framers meant
to assure security against arbitrary warrants, they could not simultaneously
have meant to preserve the constable's authority arbitrarily to find probable
cause to support a home arrest. Such a paradoxical interpretation would make
the amendment's guarantee of the right to be secure in one's person ring
hollow. If Watson was correct in stating that warrantless public arrests were
meant to endure under the fourth amendment, then the most reasonable inter-
pretation of the amendment's reference to security from personal seizure is
that it offers protection within one's dwelling, a protection Payton v. New York
revitalizes.
The Payton Court's analysis of warrantless home arrests in terms of
search and seizure precedent also is logical, particularly since there is no clear
historical support such as exists for warrantless public arrests. Search and
123. Id. at 43. The Court described this public/private distinction in G. M. Leasing Corp. v.
United States, 429 U.S. 338, 354 (1976) (quoted at 445 U.S. at 587):
It is one thing to seize without a warrant property resting in an open area or seizable by
levy without an intrusion into privacy, and it is quite another thing to effect a warranfless
seizure of property, even that owned by a corporation, situated on private premises to
which access is not otherwise available for the seizing officer.
124. See notes 27-32 supra.
125. See text accompanying notes 33-34 and note 33 supra.
126. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 429 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
127. The Payton Court indicated agreement with this view by quoting Justice Powell's concur-
ring opinion in Watson. 445 U.S. at 601.
128. This reluctance obviously stems from the separation of powers doctrine and is exempli-
fied by decisions wherein the Court seeks to construe federal statutes by scrutinizing legislative
history. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11 (1979).
129. It is important to keep in mind the caveat in Katz v. United States that "the Fourth
Amendment cannot be translated into a peneral constitutional 'right to privacy,"' for it also offers
protection from the mental harassment, including annoyance and humiliation, that is part of any
government intrusion, whether public or private. 389 U.S. at 350.
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seizure law has not merely defined procedural rules; it has developed funda-
mental principles under the fourth amendment. Therefore, if arrest is
"quintessentially a seizure," 130 then it follows "that the constitutional provi-
sion should impose the same limitations upon arrests that it does upon
searches."
131
The second reason for stressing contemporary judicial precedent over his-
tory in the case of warrantless home arrests is the Court's treatment of the
Constitution as an unfinished document, one that reflects the attitudes of each
generation applying it, not one fossilized in a colonial frame of reference.132
While such a perspective appears to conflict with the more recent reluctance of
the Court to legislate, in cases of warrantless home arrests it is appropriate.
Unless history dictates otherwise, 133 the more consistent our reading of the
fourth amendment for each issue it concerns, the more stable and strong our
law becomes, and the more certain its protections.
Despite the appropriateness of stressing contemporary search and seizure
precedent over history, the Court's perspective creates several areas of contro-
versy. Some say the Court has gone too far: requiring a warrant for all rou-
tine home arrests may force police to difficult, precipitous decisions as to
whether impending danger or emergency will vindicate a warrantless intrusion
and involve them in lengthy litigation if they decide wrongly.134 Conversely,
the Court may not have gone far enough. In leaving undefined and unexam-
ined such elements of entry and arrest as reasonable cause to believe the sus-
pect at home, consent of the accused or a third person, and exigent
circumstances, the Court arguably encourages impetuous home arrests by al-
lowing easily manipulated legal excuses.
These problems will, of course, be addressed by lower courts and in fed-
eral and state statutes, which for the most part will have to be amended to
accord with Payton. This was surely the Court's intention-to make the law,
but not, in one fell swoop, all the rules. The decision is otherwise sound in
concluding that the fourth amendment right to be secure in one's person,
house, papers, and effects merits the same treatment for seizure of persons as
for seizure of evidence. 135 Further, the decision makes more meaningful the
130. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
131. Id. Justice Powell suggests that perhaps arrest standards should be more stringent than
search standards, an arrest being not the mere inconvenience a search can be, but a "serious
personal intrusion." Id. This tips the balance described in the "symmetry" argument to a position
opposite to that of the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Payton. See text accompanying
notes 21-22 and 75 supra.
132. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
133. Even given a strong historical case, obeisance to eighteenth century ways does not neces-
sarily follow. See Note, supra note 37, at 660-61.
134. See 445 U.S. at 619 (White, J., dissenting). See also note 111 supra.
135. It is a truism worth mentioning that the Framers did not intend the present body of
search and seizure law any more than they intended its application to home arrests. It may be
argued strongly, however, that they did intend the two kinds of intrusions to be treated alike. This
intention is suggested not only by the single-phrase structure of the amendment, but also by the
amendment's purpose to restrict writs of assistance, which allowed arrests as well as searches and
seizures. See 14 AM. CRiM. L. REv., supra note 33, at 212 n.129; see also note 33 supra.
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"reasonable expectation of privacy"'136 all citizens enjoy within their homes.
Payton provides assurance that, when neither danger nor emergency moti-
vates the officer, a warrant must be obtained for a home arrest, and that a
warrant will be issued only after probable cause (as to who is suspected and
why) is sworn to and determined sufficient by a disinterested magistrate. Po-
lice officers may on occasion exceed in practice the authority the Court here
restricts; suspects may on occasion slip the dragnet or abscond with the evi-
dence. But in general, the Court's requirement of a warrant for routine home
arrests strikes an acceptable balance between a vital constitutional right and
the public's interest in effective law enforcement.
JOAN AMES MAGAT
136. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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